The Agreeable Aesthetic

The Subject of Beauty, Form & Representation

'Aesthetic'devised from the Greek word for 'things perceived by the senses'. Alexander Baumgarten 1735

'Pure judgements of taste 'beauty' cannot be based on pleasures of charm or emotion, nor simply on empirical sensations such as charming colours or pleasing tones, nor on a definitive content, but only on formal qualities'. Immanuel Kant 1790

Part One Property of the Subject. Based & Free Judgements. Significant Form. Disinterest. Dependant / non-Dependant.   The 'Aboutness'.

Part Two The Agreeable Sentiment. Representational Expectations. Necessity of the Subject.

Part Three Sensory Representations. Implementation of Concepts. Operational Qualities of the Senses. Intuition. Aesthetic Distance

Part Four Beauty and the Sublime. Consonant & Dissonant. Content / Form Reversal

Part Five Language and non-originality. Restrictions of. Secondary & Primary Content. Everything is a Text. Whistler's Mother

Part Six Content & Form Transposed. A Priori Deduction. Impossible Disinterest. An Agreeable Aesthetic

Part Seven Transition. The Invention of Beauty.   

Part One - Property of the Subject

Property of the Subject. Based & Free Judgements. Significant Form. Disinterest. Dependant / non-Dependant beauty. Aboutness.

[What] is beauty? What qualities actually constitute beauty? Is beauty derived from the object or from the subject? Is beauty purely experienced by the pleasurable? Does beauty only constitute a self-interested judgement? Can emotions impede judgements of beauty?

[The] uniqueness of the subject 'beauty' is worth exploring. Such qualities of beauty are experienced through many traditional mediums including art, sculpture, music, theatre and literature. Over the past 100 years or so and in the advent of photography and film, beauty can now be experienced through a diverse array of mediums including film, cartoons, illustration, games, mathematics, 3D printing, logic, fashion, cuisine and so on.

[This] enquiry will primarily be looking at the philosophical theories that are devoted to this subject, from how we perceive beauty, how beauty resonates within us, how beauty is regarded as a linguistic construct or a concept, to how identifying properties of beauty are considered ineffective when implementing logic. Logic and language coexist therefore, is our use of language sufficient means for expressing beauty? How many superlatives can truly express how we are moved emotionally by a visual experience? Language is infinitely finite and ultimately presents us with an impersonal expression and incomplete measure of beauty as words chosen are words pre-used.

[Some] theorists would speak of beauty entwined with moralistic and devout appreciation of spirituality presented in principled and iconic themed images. Other theorists suggest the essence of objective beauty is a quality found in everyday objects as something easily digestible, Kitsch art for example, and also a substance that directly appeals to certain sensibilities. Many would perhaps conclude that beauty is a property of the object such as size, presence or weight, something that is measurable or quantifiable identified as being an objective quality. If the later was the case, then any object specifically exhibiting any of these properties would be universally beautiful to all by reason of its objectivity. However, establishing a precise definitive and objective value of any of these proposed properties would be quite problematic as the very nature of judgements are subjective and self-interested.

[An] illustration of this subjective / objective quandary would be saying something like 'this red rose is beautiful'. Now, is this statement, a judgement of taste, true and justified by virtue of the object being a rose? or because it presents the colour red? or by cause of any rose like properties? Does this statement merely constitute an appreciation of the concept of a rose which is judged beautiful? Is it necessary for a rose to exhibit all rose like qualities to be beautiful? It goes without saying that if any of these qualities are objectively true and necessary in order to establish such beauty, it could be concluded that all red roses are beautiful. This suggestion would merely be an assumption and quite unprovable as no one has the knowledge gained from experiencing all red roses to verify this.

[The] truth is that beauty isn't anything to do with the object per se but more to do with the individual, a theory that will be investigated further. David Hume and Immanuel Kant proposed that beauty is in all actuality a 'property of the subject' that is to say, beauty is a quality of the individual and as such, individuals may feel compelled to express their experience of beauty in a sentiment directed towards the object (Hume). However, sentiments, being as they are unavoidably structured in language and as we have previously briefly established can be quite impersonal, cannot truly express our experience of higher beauty or any other beauty for that matter as beauty can often be something truly difficult to sincerely articulate.

[Nonetheless], we could argue that the sentiment of beauty afforded to the time-honoured relationship between 'beautiful' and 'baby' for example, is commended on the goodness of a newly born baby alongside the deep-rooted notion that all babies possess an intrinsic purity and innocence, and because of this notion it may seem that this association is an 'objective' property of babies and therefore, all new born babies are beautiful. Quite logical but simply unprovable. Such a statement would be a judgement purely based on an assumption and not formed by knowledge gained from experience.

[If] we were intending to pursue such a proposition through deductive reasoning then firstly, there would be a requirement to establish whether purity and innocence are objective properties, secondly, what elements would determine such properties, thirdly, whether such objective properties exist in all babies and lastly, a requirement for an individual to regard all babies to validate such properties. The term a priori is used to define this type of judgement - 'knowledge based on theoretical deduction rather than empirical observation'.

[What] we really want to do is examine the philosophical rationale that determines the ideals of higher beauty, an aesthetic which is not predisposed or aligned to a concept or idea, not morally favoured or based on virtuous values and not formulated from any logical understanding. The function of understanding within this framework of theorising is detrimental to the realisation of higher beauty as adopting any cognitive processes will lead us towards the implementation of concepts, which only serve to distinguish conceptualised attributes from psychological phenomena, which by their nature are predisposed. We are naturally compelled to establish an understanding of all our perceptions but in the presence of beauty, understanding is not as useful as it may seem as we will endeavour to conceptualise.

[Predisposed] or based judgements are acknowledged as being pre-conditioned and as such are not typically free of discriminations or self-interest. Theoretically, any pre-conditioned judgement is applied with a desired state of understanding or to make sense of the non-sensical. Such judgements are affiliated to concepts. Therefore, based judgements are not considered free judgements. To realise the experience of higher beauty any judgement needs to be made free of preconditions, free from concepts and free from self-interest.

[The] aesthetic associated with representational art for example can be arrived at through preconditioned judgements and as such would be based on the artwork's constituents such as narrative, colour-fields, subject matter, political relevance or religious connotations or even based on how significant the artist is. If such a judgement was made of The Pieta by Giotto for example, the aesthetic would be founded on (dependant on) its association to spiritual significance, mournful piety, emotional force and divine iconography. In addition, the relevance of a renowned artist could also be considered. This judgement is theorised as being a dependant beauty. What we want to establish is a non-dependant beauty. When a judgement of the aesthetic is made on the dependency of its content, this would not be considered a judgement of free beauty as this dependency is informed by preconditioning and perhaps self-interest. In this example the narrative connotation of the spiritual significance of Mary supporting the body of the dying Christ is a dependant beauty. The judgement is preconditioned by a canonic spiritual narrative. Kant would appraise this as a judgement of the good.

   Giotto. Pieta 1304-1306

[Free] judgements constitute an appraisal of the aesthetic that leads us towards 'free beauty'. Free beauty is considered non-dependent and free from self-interest and as such, judgements are deemed to be considered ends in themselves, that is to say, a judgement of the aesthetic is made for no other purpose than the aesthetic. Kant's theory would suggest that we are making a judgement of the purposeless purpose in as much as we are estimating a purpose for the aesthetic without any association to a concept. Similarly, Oscar Wilde advocated art needed no justification or purpose other than art itself, 'art for art's sake'.

[Based] judgements are considered to be hybrid assessments constituting a dependency on the constituents of the content, the emotional fluidity of reception of these qualities and authorship. Objects that we covet inevitably fall into this category of based and dependant judgements. An object that is deemed beautiful purely based on its emotional gravity for example, will not constitute a free judgement as we are initially making a judgement that appeals to a favourable quality or emotion. Due to this emotional favourability we therefore believe it as beautiful. Kant theorises this aspect of the judgement termed a dependant beauty. Within art, dependant beauty is be related to the referential, narrative, content and the familiar.

[According] to Kant, we can find a non-dependant beauty that releases us from making a judgement inferred by the referential content and conceptualised aesthetic and that is the beauty derived from form itself. It is the formal qualities of the object that supersedes content.

[Clive] Bell and Roger Fry pursued an increasing popular formalist theory in the early 20th century termed Significant Form proposing that form alone can convey feeling. Roger Fry made a distinction within the formalist approach between 'pure form' (beauty) and associated ideas (dependant attributes such as content). He declared that an individual can respond to form alone without considering any associated ideas or representational expectations. Such a response would be independent of content. And further added, the content of art was only created to be associated with the 'dramatic idea', for example, representational content was purely constructed with a single objective, to convey meaning. Such meaning detracted the individual from appreciating form. Fry also attempted to establish a sense of structural form influenced by planner and recessive rendering suggesting movement, rotational qualities, weight, gravity and solidity perceived and defined amongst the assemblage of referents, how they are composed, constructed and situated within the painting on various vertical and horizontal axis and groupings. As such, applying a formalist interpretive deduction could site value in a work of art regardless of content or subject matter.

[In] contrast however, Hegel proposed that beauty was not just a consideration of or restricted to the surface prettiness of the canvass but embraced all that constitutes art including both form and content. Hegel also implied that beauty of the sublime (discussed in Part Four) was not the employ of the artist to represent the sublime in nature but to propagate reception responses to both mind and spirit. The sublime was to be redeemed by the mind and therefore would be unsuccessful with its representation expressed in art.

[Hegel] had an intrinsic belief that art represented a spiritual understanding of the self, not in concepts or images of faith such as Giotto's Pieta, but through artefacts made specifically for expressing a spiritual consciousness. Hegel's beauty is specifically focused towards the devout ability or intent of the act of creativity and not the resulting composition. Much like Collingwood's Art Proper (discussed further on) it is the initial unconditional appetite and compulsion to express rather than the final artistic outcome and content. Although Collingwood's theory is not concerned with beauty per se, the sentiment is equivalent.

[The] value of Hegel's beauty was allied to spirituality. Objects rendered with artistic sensibility such as poems, carvings, music and art expressed freedom of the spiritual of the self. He also inferred that such freedom of creativity and outcomes were inherently beautiful because they expressed this freedom.

Vermeer The Art of Painting c.1662-1668

[Fry's] sense of structural form is exhibited in Vermeer's The Art of Painting, two centuries before Fry was born. Putting aside the narrative content and how this would resonate with us, there is a definite display of formal qualities, the paintings purely visual qualities. There is a sense of 'aesthetic pleasure' informed by colour fields, brush strokes, compositional structure, vertical, horizontal and diagonal plains, the use of light and shadow and a sense of spacial distribution. The arrangement of form supersedes that of content, and it is this aspect that presents higher beauty. In comparison, Giotto's Pieta seems relatively flat in terms of movement and spatiality and is quite arduous in its viewing but does exhibit some similar properties as Vermeer's.

[The] representational content of art, that which implies meaning, can alter overtime being implicated by political and societal insights, new interpretation theories, individual experiences, influential and modern trends towards what is considered morally relative to our presentism of personal expression, a New Moralism (Harold Bloom), a type of retro introspection identifying the absence of anything currently relevant, for example questioning any canonical structure or narrative, a popular Art History criterion, more so with the recent development of the representational body type in gender identity ideology. This aspect of 'art'ificial appreciation of the bodily form is primarily concerned with ideological consumption and consumerism. Such representations are a means towards moral and political nourishment no matter who this serves or disturbs. Simply put, the human aesthetic has become political. This pseudo-political exploit has instigated a blurring between popular culture and high culture. On one hand, pursuing a sustained attempt to represent those who may have been in a sense historically and institutionally side-lined, and on the other, this exploitive enterprise has also reinforced a culture divide. Historically though, the formalist qualities of art have until now remained constant and it is these constants that endure time and present a higher beauty.

[Seeking] a higher beauty in the human form could undoubtedly be implicated by any current societal attitudes which would constitute a dependency upon the judgement. This dependency is considered to be defined by content informed by a diverge set of social attitudes which will ultimately impede the true appreciation of form, as such a diversity of tastes, judgements and disagreements would ultimately impede any development of a canonic evaluative structure. However, we can say that the body is beautiful which could be determined by the balance and harmony of its constituent parts illustrated as a whole, regardless of any social influences or ideology. This judgement can only be realised by negating the social attention of the subject (content) being a human body, that is to say, it's beauty would be considered purely as a form.

[Preceding] ancient Greek civilisation by some 26,000 years, figurative modelling of the human body was rendered in bone, ivory or stone. Two of the earliest known examples of hand-held female figurative representations are the Venus of Willendorf and Venus of Brassempouy the later which signified the revelation of the human face. A simple recess just below the forehead tentatively represents the eyes, the birth of sensitivity and the first realisation of the representation of beauty. Ancient Greek artists developed and pursued sculptural development of formalistic sensibility which set the benchmark for rendering the ideal human form in marble and bronze, the individuals from the paleolithic period carved their votives perhaps in the same articulative nature as they used their language. It is possible that the development of language and the development of art were somewhat symbiotic.

 Venus de Willendorf c.28,000BC                                                                            Venus de Brassempouy c.25,000BC

[Presuming] language was in its infancy and theoretically also representational art, it is feasible that our ancestors did not possess the artistic skillset to articulate memetic and sentimental rendering neither the necessary tools to do so. It could also be suggested that the chthonic materials used for modelling informed the quality of reproduction. For these reasons, it could be concluded that formalistic modelling was simply the easiest and most natural way of expression in such relief material. However, and regardless of this proposition, these votive forms are rendered in such a way as to present a slightly ambiguous humanistic sensibility (content) where certain features were suggested rather than intrinsically modelled.

[Content] can be considered as the secondary status for beauty as content is dependent, that is to say it derives meaning from an association, narrative or representational expectation. It is obvious however that form itself is the primary consideration which presents us with a higher beauty as it is a non-dependent, that is to say it does not depend on any other condition except itself to be deemed beautiful.

[These] examples were not a representation of a particular individual as such but represented more of a symbolic meaning through representation. The Venus de Willendorf for example is thought to represent the Great Earth Mother, agricultural fertility and the virtue of human creation. There is a lack of modulation and rendering of limbs (the superficial / content) which heightens attention to the symbolic attributes. As previously suggested, it is quite possible that whilst language was in still evolving towards articulation, the ability to render any sense of beauty or sensibility could have been relatively limited. Noam Chomsky has suggested that the beginnings of language was established approximately 40,000 to 50,000 years ago and therefore any linguistic structure or expression would have been very limited, as well as the variety of nouns, adjectives and superlatives and so on. Therefore, any pictorial representational would simply be allegorical.

[The] ideal human form though was established and perfected in Greek sculpture from over two millennia with a resurgence and renewed vigour during the Renaissance where the Beauty of the Body was flaunted with romantic youthful masculinity and brazen sassiness such as Michelangelo and Donatello's David, respectively. It is evident that gender identity has always been represented.

Michelangelo David c.1504                                                                                                                               Donatello David c.1440

N.B. the original rendering of veins in Greek sculpture were representative of the pneumatic soul                                         

[Greek] philosopher Chrysippus (circa 240BC) declared that beauty of the human form does not consist in the elements themselves as properties of the objects, but in their harmonious relationship to one another, their overall formal composition. Polykleitos's canon of sculptural representation of the body also emphasised a harmonious composition of form that endured time and represented beauty of form. The worship of the Gods became the worship of beauty. During the Golden Age of Greek sculpture, sculptors endeavoured to represent the ideal human form, form being the ultimate aspiration and appetite. As the sculptor's skill progressed and ideals realised, the visualisation was further enhanced with the adoption of drapery (chiton) which ebbed and flowed over the marble human structure with formalist sensibility, The Charioteer of Delphi for example.

                          The Charioteer of Delphi. 470 BC

[The] representative formalistic qualities of Greek sculpture continually developed towards a complete mastery of medium. The pursuit of an absolute symbolic form was eventually being superseded by the representation of pathos (Laocoon) and modesty (Aphrodite of Knidos the first completely nude female form) which resulted in a redirection of focus towards narrative, human fallibilities and the elements of beauty (content). The ideal beauty of sculpture was becoming semi-dependant on content, from primary representation to secondary representation.

 The Fallen Warrior Temple of Aphaia c.500BC

[The] Fallen Warrior from the Temple of Aphaia's East facing pediment is an excellent example of the Greek sculptor's development towards a primary status of form and harmony. There is a hint of humanistic sensibility in the face of the warrior (the Archaic smile) but not quite the representation of pathos. The expression is a little ambiguous perhaps. If the facial features were further drafted allowing a more conclusive sentiment of expression (conceptual and dependant attributes), then the beauty of the sculpture would be leaning more towards content and would be deemed beautiful because of this. The almost perfectly formed circle of the warrior's shield displays the sculptor will to model and perfect form.

[Kant's] theory of higher beauty draws us away from understanding how we perceive in terms of the conceptual attributes drawn from content towards form itself, thereby freeing us to appreciate form and experience the aesthetic in feeling without any cognitive or conceptual dissolution posited by social stereotyping. Beauty should be a non-dependant awareness within the subject (the individual), uncomplicated by cognitive ideas, understanding or concepts brought into focus by an unconditional seeking of contemplative disinterested harmony. This autonomous seeking is purely driven by instinct and merely contemplative. Pleasure does not have to be sought or allied to any end, except an end in itself.

[In] experiencing the aesthetic, we are not intending to reach an understanding of what we perceive, only a self-acknowledgment of an agreeable sensory appreciation, a non-external independent feeling. We are stilled by our subjective disposed response to an object. The term disposed in this context is used to express a subjective response that is accustomed in all individuals, a universal subjectivity. Higher beauty, that which rescinds language, pleases universally without the need for conceptualising.

[The] term disinterested is easy to explain but difficult to put into practice. When we make a judgement of taste for the purpose of identifying beauty, such a judgement is by its nature subjective and therefore pre-disposed and biased according to our representational expectations (explained in Part Two). This type of judgement would be deemed an interested one, as we are making a comparative assessment based on our previous experiences of the similar, pleasurable or non-pleasurable. True judgements of beauty are considered to be only made in the disinterest.

[An] uninterested judgement is just that, a dismissive assessment of an object based on uninterested participation and lack of interest. Assessing an objects aesthetic nature in neither a biased nor dismissive judgement is termed a state of disinterest - we must rescind all representational expectations, positive and negative biases in order to make a free undiscriminative judgement. Therefore, the perspective of disinterest assumes and implies that a thing is neither good, moral, perfect, pure nor pleasurable.  

   Giotto. Pieta 1304-1306 Marcel Duchamp                                                              Nude Descending a Staircase No.2 1912

             (representational CONTENT)                                                                                        (non-representational FORM)

[The]representational content - Giotto's painting depicts a dependant beauty sensitive to the content, a dependency relating to the spiritual (the moral) and the virtuous (the good) embodied in human form (a concept for understanding). The representational form - Duchamp's painting, also depicting human form and whilst being considered within this theory of higher beauty, has no dependence to the moral or the good and is free of any other dependant. Remember, we are considering pure form (the aesthetic) as a judgement free from predisposed ideas.

[Duchamp's] referential as form is suggested only by the signifier's nude, descending and staircase presented in such a manner as to playfully engage our imagination, understanding and intuition in an attempt identify what we actually want to see, the form suggestive of perhaps a body, perhaps a female. Failing to clearly identify the content we are forced perhaps to perceive the something other, the aboutness of form. This illustrates a predisposed attempt to conceptualise. Further, whilst we utilise a measure of understanding to apply a familiar concept to Duchamp's image in order to release us from such anonymity of perception, we cannot, and we are left to consider the compositions form, the something other, the aboutness. We may betray our true realisation of beauty by consciously and purposefully engaging our cognitive capabilities, purging our imagination into the realm of understanding, and from understanding to concepts. This beauty then becomes dependant. These two approaches demonstrate that pure beauty is a property of the subject (the individual) and not the object.

[Human] beings habitually engage visually with everyday objects. Individuals are also drawn to the un-accustomed and this natural instinct draws a conscious yet autonomous propagation for understanding and conceptualising. Once our cognitive process has applied a concept for an object, it's value to an individual is established and this value sits in a personal hierarchy of interest. It could be proposed that Kant's theory of pure beauty relates to a specific moment in time of observation where an object is momentarily perceived free and unattached from any cognitive process and the feeling of which is not consciously sustained but felt, free of self-interest and hierarchical positioning.

[A] similar theory has been made by R.G. Collingwood with his theory of art proper in his book The Principles of Art. Collingwood attempts to distinguish pure art from craft, the equivalence of non-dependant and dependant beauty. He suggests that art proper, pure art, is neither considered nor based on ideas or concepts. In contrast, he suggests that craft is not considered art because the creative process is a system of consideration and intentional activity which opposes the creative purity of art. This aspect was also considered by Donald Judd in his writings entitled Specific Objects which emphasised the differences between modernist and pre-modernist sculptural practices. Modernist sculptors became more orchestrated using unconventional materials and construction methods being less traditional in their methodology than their predecessors and therefore are theoretically considered impure or too considered.

[Pure] art is therefore instinctually creative whereas craft is a planned creative objective. There are further nuances in Collingwood's theory which further develop and define these differences. What distinguishes art from craft is the process of consideration - 'intra' and 'extra' or 'meta'. Intra-consideration is the moment when an individual identifies an internal need to express an emotion, a cathartic relief. Meta-consideration is a term applied to the pre-determined and measured thought-out process and the predicted outcome of craft. The later can betray any creative sensibilities.

[Meta]-consideration and dependency of beauty are comparable in as much as both are determined by content rather than form - content being equivalent to cognitive applications. Therefore, 'meta' denotes a considered attempt to expedite or engage purposely to an end, a type of dependency for execution. Equally, one could say that 'dependant beauty' is also an active cognitive engagement to establish a value for and justify or conceptualise beauty. Both cognitive applications negate a certain purity - meta overrides creative sensibility and a dependency for beauty overrides the higher aesthetic, which also devalues sensibilities as we move from an aesthetic feeling towards a concept for understanding.

[There] is a comparable supposition between Kant's and Collingwood's theories, both positing a similar premise denoting the significance of what is considered to be something of a non-cognitive state of awareness of a higher state of beauty and at the point where art is initially created. Art proper and Kant's theory of the higher beauty is neither pre-disposed or dependant, whereas the process of craft and the aesthetic derived from content rather than form, is disposed and interdependent. Art proper or pure artis therefore a momentary non-preconditioned instantaneous breath of imagination and instinct which establishes the creative act, a non-dependent inter-considered reaction to creative stimuli. As with Kant's theory, once moved from imagination to understanding and meta-consideration (concepts) the purity is lost.

[The] agreeable aesthetic concerns the unique 'aboutness' (the something other) of an object which stimulates an unbound emotion without the necessity for understanding and maintaining such a natural state of awareness and appreciation of these formal qualities, pure beauty is then realised.

Part Two - The Agreeable Sentiment

The Agreeable Sentiment. Representational Expectations. Necessity of the Subject.

[The] agreeable sentiment is a theory proposed by 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume proposing that the nature of beauty does not lie in the object itself, it is not a property of the object such as size or weight, congruent with Kant's theory of beauty. In effect, when describing all the qualities of an object, this does not tell us anything of the object's beauty. For example, Euclid's (circa 300BC) treatise on geometry, in particular the five platonic solids, can be defined in geometrical and mathematical sentiments, but says nothing of their beauty. A purist mathematician would no doubt perceive beauty within these numerical relationships. Kant would deem this a dependent beauty (of the pleasurable) as the beauty here is derived from the functioning of geometry. Similarly, with early Greek sculpture, there was a certain element of mathematical calculation and symmetry in an attempt to create the perfect human form but this approach of imposing mathematics on Nature resulted in static modulation and required further development which was instigated by the contrapposto pose which provided a new modelling standard of asymmetry and poise of the human form. Greek physicians were prompted by this discovery to reinterpret their understanding of the schematics of internal organs which were thought to be symmetrical in their positioning. The contrapposto stand aided the discovery of asymmetry of bodily organs.

[Another] example of dependent beauty would be that of a decorative knife with a Damascus steel blade. Do we appreciate the aesthetic of this knife solely as an object in and of itself regardless of its function? Or do we associate the value of the aesthetic (its beauty) from the pleasure derived from its function, the condition of being a knife, the fashion of balance in the hand, how it effortlessly slices with little resistance, the quality of craftsmanship and so on. This type of associated value is considered by Hume as a self-interested beauty as he states that objects have no value in themselves. Objects only derive value based on our passion (pleasure) for them, we covet what we desire. Kant would consider this passion to object relationship an interested beauty as we seek gratification in the object for our own pleasure. We are seduced to possess the beautiful object and by the same measure, we are seduced by the concept.

[Hume] therefore concluded that the quality of beauty exists in the sentiment we make towards an object, a consequence of the interaction between our sensibilities, imagination and the artefact, a catalyst towards understanding. However, such sentiments are not to be confused with sentiments about the object, more expressions of taste of the observer. Individuals project desirable attributes towards an object as conditions of its beauty with sentiments and these sentiments are derived from our representational expectations influenced by other similar experiences.

[If] this interactional play is sustained without conclusion in the event that we are unable to articulate what we see, then we reach an agreeable aesthetic experiencing a higher beauty. This aesthetic response is an experience of feeling and not an experience of concepts. However, if finalised where we are in a position to apply concepts and ascertain value in relation to our self-interests, then we depart from a higher beauty to a dependant beauty, into the realm of ideas and understanding.

[In] essence representational expectations are the expectations prompted within us when observing a "beautiful' object urging a necessity for understanding, which is brought about by implementing previous visual and pleasurable experiences from other similar objects towards this new experience. In essence, trying to establish value in the object. Such representational expectations are informed by both secondary elements (content) and primary elements (form). Secondary elements are described as light, shading and colour and so on, which lie not the objects themselves but only in the senses, hence their secondary status. These attributes are subjective and universal. This leads us towards a type of necessity to identify and understand what we see. Here we move towards the necessity of the subject.

        Jackson Pollock BLUE POLES 1952                                                                           Clyfford Still J No.2 (PH-401) 1957

[Blue] Poles by abstract expressionist Jackson Pollock, displays a non-referential composition consisting solely of secondary elements - colour and texture which do illicit an ambiguous primary element of form, of a type suggested by the intersectional boundaries of individual colour fields, which is totally unavoidable. PH-401 No.2 by Still exhibits exactly the same colour field boundary elements which are more prominent and quite profound due to the application of a minimum number of colours reinforcing a conceptualising of form by juxtaposition. Harold Rosenberg (1962) wrote of the abstract painters, 'Calling this art 'abstract' or 'Expressionist' or 'Abstract Expressionist', what counts is its special motive for extinguishing the object'. I would propose that 'extinguishing the object' amounts to an attempt to extinguish the concept thereby establishing a prospect of higher beauty by eliminating any sense of dependency on content, narrative, figurative representation or concept and possibly extinguishing language all together, an indication given by the title of Still's canvass. Rosenberg, 'Language has not accustomed itself to a situation in which the act (the painted canvass) itself is the object'.In comparison, the Pieta, which is totally referential where all meaning is illustrated with realism embodied in human form, a combination of secondary and primary elements, in a direct attempt to illicit an emotive experience, especially when formulated in a spiritual scenario.

[Necessity] of the subject - We can declare that the necessity of the subject is a necessity within the observer derived indirectly from the object, a necessity for understanding what we perceive. This cognitive activity (necessity) prompts a sentiment of beauty towards the object. However, sentiments are not representational but are abstract suggesting that such sentiments do not reflect or prove that beauty is a property of the object. Sentiments of beauty can occur in the absence in the object in that an object does not have to exist as a sentiment can be drawn from our imagination. And further, sentiments cannot be representational due to biases and are only related to the 'object and the mind of the individual'. Therefore, although Blue Poles and PH-401 No.2 constitutes secondary elements which are not considered as higher beauty as they induce sentiments which are inconclusive, the composition leaves us with a consideration of form, as we cannot extract meaning from the composition as we can with Pieta. So, Kant's theory of higher beauty, that for form alone can be applied and an agreeable aesthetic comes in to play. As with Duchamp's Nude Descending A Staircase, secondary elements have been purposely inhibited to flatten contextual meaning and can therefore demonstrate the higher beauty of form, as we are unable to formalise a concept of what is depicted (as previously discussed).

[So], is there a framework that we can work with that can suggest or prove that an artefact is indeed beautiful? According to Hume, this is possible by the agreeable sentiment. Hume proposes that if such a sentiment is made declaring that an object beautiful, and if such a sentiment is necessitated and agreeable by the select and such agreeability is permeated historically over time then Hume concludes that such an agreeable sentiment holds value in its declaration, Greek sculpture being just one example, classical literature being another. Such sentiments become canonic.

Part Three - Sensory Representations

Sensory Representations. Implementation of Concepts. Operational Qualities of the Senses. Intuition. Aesthetic Distance

[The] dialogue of the agreeable aesthetic and the agreeable sentiment presents us with a further enquiry of the notion of interpretation and internal sensory representations. Both agreements indicate that an internal dialogue for identifying beauty is derived indirectly from the object via the conduit of our senses (the nebulas of intuition, imagination and understanding) which is expressed as a concept, a sentiment or an agreement. However, do our sensory representations actually tell us anything about the perceived object, within an objective reality? Do we possess an inherent predisposed understanding of reality determined by factors we are not aware of? Do our senses provide an indirect or direct experience with reality?

[Hegel] attacks this essence of immediacy of a direct experience of reality and objects, in this case the objects beauty, the aesthetic. Hegel proposes that there is not a direct link between an individual and an object due to our implementation of concepts. We perceive concepts, not the actual object and these concepts are derived from a complex range of sensory information delivered by our senses. Between ourselves and the object lies a cognitive library of categorisations and these unitise as a concept in the presence of an object.

[There] is an indirect connection to reality through sensory representation and as such, all representations are subjective because there is no proof that these representations correspond with the external reality. Even with the implementation of logic, we remain in the same situation as logic is not decisive in determining such objectivity. For example, we can utilise logic to determine or prove the existence of God, but with the same logic we can proof the non-existence of God. This is no different as to whether the colour red can be logically proved to be red besides stating that it is not another colour such as green. There is an equivalency here with Hume's agreeable sentiments in that "sentiments of beauty can occur in the absence in the object in that an object does not have to exist, a sentiment can be drawn from our imagination".

[So], how does this observation relate to our theory of the agreeable aesthetic in that, these perceptions are properties of the subject, the individual? Features of sensory perception differ between individuals. One example would be the discrepancies associated with colour blindness, green determined as blue and so on. In this scenario, what would be the true and objective colour of an object? It would seem that neither of these can be said to be the objects real feature. So therefore, each sense-perception must be merely a subjective assertion towards the object by a sentiment or an agreed aesthetic.

[Therefore], our senses have particular operational qualities that work in specific ways and so therefore, objects are simply a qualitative amalgamation of the qualities of our senses, and these potentially pose as obstacles to our perception of things as they exist objectively. Observations are digested internally, prepared conceptually, formalised and expressed as sentiments and or agreements made domestically by the individual.

[Our] intuition also has an integral part in identifying and implementing categorisations, formed in language and learnt representative expectations which will also demonstrate the subjective objectivity of objects, and beauty. According to Kant, identifying objects in order to make a judgement on the aesthetic, sensory representations and the representation of things via the senses (what we perceive), initiates an internal dialogue between our intuition, imagination and knowledge, a basis for understanding. For example, when we see a cat, or what looks like a cat, we use our intuition to identify what we see combined with our knowledge of what a cat is, then apply the concept of a cat towards this representation. A course grained structure of identification.

[Once] we have established and categorised what we are looking at our representational expectations and past experiences will then play a part in determining the aesthetic, it's beauty. If our past experiences of interaction with cats has been positive, then we are perhaps pre-disposed to favour a sentiment of beauty towards it. The opposite if our experiences have been negative. This can also be the case when we are considering the beauty of art. Something in the familiar will bias a positive sentiment.

[This] bias sentiment will not be a free judgement as we are judging content (secondary) over form (primary). In this case, the content is derived from our pleasurable experiences we have had with cats, how they look, how they act, how they play and purr. Such attributes arise from a particular fabric of human sentimentality. If we just consider the form of the cat, devoid of our emotional attachment and sentimentality, would we still say the cat is beautiful? Would the form necessitate a higher beauty?

[There] is an additional theory within the framework for an assessment of the aesthetic that relates to the subject's attachment and sentimentality towards representations termed aesthetic distance. Comparable to Kant's disinterest, aesthetic distance concerns the psychological relationship, designated distance, between the viewer and the representation of the object. Reflecting a certain amount of disinterest, critical detachment and learnt biases, it is a necessity of the subject to background any familiarities and emotional responses cultivating a unique interpretation and free judgement.

[A] familiar example of distancing which can be illustrated by a thunderstorm at sea experienced from two viewpoints. One viewpoint would be observing the picturesque display of the storm from the safety of the shoreline, and the other from being out at sea in the horror of the maelstrom. Both viewpoints reflect the foregrounding and backgrounding of emotional attachment. Even though the phenomenon is an isolated entity for perception, it can illicit two separate (subjective) judgements. As with disinterest, negating either attachments or biases could be problematic. This would apply to making a judgement concerning the beauty of an object. In this case both viewpoints would be dependant judgements.

Part Four - The Beauty; The Sublime

Consonant & Dissonant. Qualitative & Quantitative. Content / Form Reversal. Imagination to the faculty of Reason.

[Higher] beauty, which has been established as form, remains constant and as Chrysippus declares exhibits a harmonious relationship of its constituents. Higher beauty is consonant. Our enquiry has also established that representational content exhibits a type of inferred 'disharmony' in as much as such content involves dependant assessments, emotional attachments and has the ability to be reinterpreted over time. Content can be considered as dissonant.

[The] sublime departs somewhat from the assessment of an object's beauty towards our experiences with natural phenomena, a direct connection with nature. As with higher beauty, its status is established in the non-articulated, an experience of feeling rather than thought. Beauty of the sublime can be similarly established in a non-articulated feeling but in this instance, where we appear to be at odds with nature, such a feeling is induced by the vastness, the unquantifiable, the unmeasurable and the incomprehensible, an overwhelming of the senses from a power that seeks to destroy us. Beauty is established within our freedom of thought and reasoning outside of the laws of nature. How this is established is not clear as it is also quite difficult to articulate.

[Higher] beauty is a positive experience, the sublime is a negative experience. However, beauty is established in the sublime as we are empowered with a superasensory faculty. In other words we have the ability to transcend the bounds of normal sensory experience which allows the elimination of the thought of peril from such experience such as watching a thunderstorm at sea from the shoreline for example. We encounter the destructive powers of nature, but we are able to relieve ourselves from the feeling of danger and experience pleasure in the spectacle. We realise nature has no dominium over us. Such beauty is defined in the qualitative.

[There] is also another aspect of the sublimity of nature that induces beauty and that is the 'measurable that cannot be quantified' where we are silenced in awe of the vastness of nature, for example, the number of stars seen on a clear night or a vista of the Himalayas. We have a faculty for quantifying which can lead to understanding, but when presented with such immensity and perhaps what seems like an infinite quantity, we are unable to utilise our ability for measuring which leaves us with a feeling of disharmony.

[Remember], the sublime in this example is dissonant, a disharmony between imagination and reason; beauty is consonant, a harmony of free play of imagination and reason. However, in order for us to find harmony in the sublime, our faculty of imagination turns solely to reason to aid understanding, as we are creatures that necessitate knowledge and understanding. Utilising reason reveals a faculty that is greater than nature and we realise that we have the ability to transcend disharmony and fear - experiencing a thunderstorm at a distance for example. We experience pleasure in this transcendence and admire the beauty of what lies before use. It is worthwhile to note that Kant would contest that sublimity, a judgement of the sublime is a property of the subject and therefore, nature itself is not sublime, only our irrational apprehension of natures' awe is.

Part Five - Language and non-originality

Language and non-originality. Restrictions of. Everything is a Text. Primary Content. Secondary Content. Representation of a Representation.

Whistler's Mother

[When] presented with the aesthetic (beauty), it is indeed a subjective experience, more so when the aesthetic is allegorically figurative and representational through content, such as the Pieta. The Pieta's beauty lies in the dependant of the good, morality and virtue. However, such inclinations can only be made if an individual is aware of such named qualities. It could be argued that these qualities are a learnt appreciation rather than a free unconsidered appreciation. In addition, such qualities are identified and founded on the positive and negative connotations of opposites, drawn from and inherent in our use of language. Meaning can only be derived from the opposite or what is termed, the presence of absence, absence being defined as that (the opposite) which is not present. We are aware of this absence which informs our use of the word that is present. For example, when the term beauty is used it's opposite (ugly) is absent but this absence gives the word beauty meaning. Such oppositions can even be reduced too and expressed in voiced and unvoiced letters. Such a theory has been established in linguistics. The associative or metaphorical aspect of sentence structuring can provide us with the possibility of innovative new ways to articulate beauty but the limitations of this are obvious.

[When] we believe an object is beautiful, we feel we are expressing a free judgement, but we are not. As discussed earlier, concepts are encoded in language and we are only able to express such concepts within the familiarisation of our knowledge of our own language. The constraints of language prevent free judgements in as much as we are predominately biased with language use, positively or negatively. The course grained structure of our vocabulary inhibits a free thought of new and unique experiences. When we believe we are experiencing something unique, we can only express our feelings about this in a confined and restricted, almost prescribed manor. So, witnessing the something or 'aboutness' of an object that cannot be articulated is probably representative of the beautiful.

[Articulation] of any experience is a designation embedded in language, in text. Everything is a text. French philosopher Jacques Derrida declared there is nothing outside of the text. There is no subjectivity or objectivity only designations that connect us to reality. Language is a system of differences; differences give meaning and help us identify objects. Language provides a structural syntax. Anything beyond language therefore does not exist. However, things do exist outside of language, outside of a text, and these are certain experiences that go beyond concepts and simply appear as a higher beauty. The non-articulated experiences, or the aboutness of things, in effect distinguishing texts from non-texts. However, the structuring of language cannot tell us anything of an objective beauty as we are peering through a structure of concepts too.

[The] constraints of language compel and necessitate an impersonal reworking of words. We therefore express our judgements of the aesthetic in the familiar and the non-original, what has already been expressed with language has already been expressed. Here lies Kant's experience of feeling and not of concepts. What cannot be expressed in language holds higher beauty, the 'aboutness' that is impossible to articulate. As Wittgenstein once said, "The limits of my language are the limits of my world".

[The] primary status of representation, form and form alone, could be conceptualised in morality, meaning and value, such as a religious symbol of a crucifix for example, but there is no higher beauty related to the 'aboutness' of this form as throughout history the Cross has been canonised and intrinsically identified with religion. Therefore, there is no higher beauty here, only a dependant one, dependant on its intrinsic identity. The 'aboutness' of form is found in the inability to conceptualise that which appeals to the senses, internalised with playful participation of the imagination towards understanding but unwittingly failing to attach any linguistic designation. Feeling the aesthetic by a non-purposeful negation of a linguistic presence is where a higher aesthetic lies.

[The] secondary status of content, especially in art, in conjunction with representational form, concludes in concepts and understanding, meaning and value. These conclusions can be considered as dependant judgements formed in language that are not free of individual expression, as we are expressing in pre-disposed word experience (albeit concepts). The experience of higher beauty lies not in language, bypassing Hegel's hypothesis of the net of concepts. Language can inhibit direct experience as we think with language.

[A] person who feels they are expressing an original and non-dependent sentiment of beauty which will be embedded in language, is perhaps not being individualistic or unique at all even though one may think so. This is a common mistake as such a sentiment is informed by concepts which have already been noted as being an indirect connection to reality. Even if associated concepts are accessed to refine sentimentalities (these are positioned on the vertical axis of sentence structuring) this will simply represent an individualistic choosing of pre-used concepts where originality is finite.

[Related] to the theory of primary and secondary status elements of form and content, John Locke wrote of primary qualities being inherent in the object themselves such as shape, sodility, extension, and form, whereas secondary qualities (content) represent the disposition of objects to create sense experience such a taste, colour and pleasure, inferring that content creates the beautiful experience but as we have seen, this would be catagorised as a dependency for beauty. Locke's example is this, 'you cannot annex the idea of blue to the intrinsic qualities of a violet flower in the same way that you cannot attribute pain to a steel knife'. In other words, content is not a fixed attribute of the object or form, if it was then all such objects would exhibit this property therefore all content is subjective and has meaning to each individual. Locke predicts that these secondary qualities are necessary in establishing a sensory experience which can alter in our perception but the object itself remains consistent.

[One] could consider form and content (primary and secondary statutory elements) as oppositions as it is feasible one cannot exist without the other or, one element is only evident and acknowledged because of the recognition of the other even in absence. This relates to the philosophical linguistic system of the 'presence of absence', another theoretical episode pertaining to linguistics by Derrida. However, this oppositional conflict and reliance for meaning through opposites and absences can be traced back to ancient Greece through their worship of the antagonistic Gods, Apollo and Dionysus. Calculation, precision, orderliness, clarity and articulation are considered an Apollonian trait whilst in opposition dis-order, provocation, mischief and chaos which are considered Dionysian. The harmonising essence of Apollo was countered and opposed by the dysfunctional spirit of Dionysus. To complete this mythological opposition in a visual sense the Greeks transformed the once bearded virile masculine Apollo, originally a personification of the Daphnephoros or 'laurel-bearer' adopted from the harvest festival rituals, to the harmonious form of the beautiful Boy, an ephebe in perfection. He is fabricated form. Dionysus remained portrayed as the bearded masculine jest of dis-harmony, the advocate of drama and heir to the Great Earth Mothers chthonic nature. These ritualised daemonic spirits transported to the province of the God immortals obviously represented elements of the human psyche and personality traits.

[The] symbolism of the Apollonian and Dionysian conflict was important to Nietzsche who considered artistic creation and sensibility to be a balance between the Apollonian and the Dionysian personality of the individual. Apollonian nature freezes the living in to objects of art for contemplation. Dionysian nature is the primal attachment to and expression of nature. Both are necessary for the creation of art. As with the linguistic oppositions of absence and presence and the opposing characteristics of form and content, both are necessary to create meaning and to create existence.

[Similar] in sentiment to Nietzche's understanding of the internal oppositional conflicts within each artist that are fundamental and necessary to be a creative, Erich Neumann wrote in his discourse published 1959 'Art and the Creative Unconscious', "that it is the unity of the ego and the {primitive} self (Freud's Id) that determines the creative process which also contain the zones of rigidity (Apollonian) and chaos (Dionysian) that threaten the life of the conscious man. In the creative sphere they give rise to a third term, which embraces and transcends them both, and this is Form". Neumann's form constitutes two poles of oppositions, that of rigidity and that of chaos which are drawn together in form. This profound observation was intended to understand the idiosyncrasy of Leonardo Da Vinci's systematic and logical scientific rationale with his visionary creative nature.

[Such] theories could explain the artistic 'type' when considering aesthetic differences in abstract expressionist art. Comparing the canvas of Blue Poles by Jackson Pollock and the formalistic controlled canvas of the Dutch artist Piet Mondrian, one could conclude that Pollock's artistic type would be Dionysian. During a meeting in 1942 with Jackson, Hans Hoffman asked of Pollock, "Do you work from Nature?" Pollock replied, "I am Nature". Dionysus is the God of wine, intoxication and ironically the God of liberation. Alcohol freed the inner spirit. Jackson Pollock addictively consumed the spirit of Dionysus. In contrast however, the extreme formal purity and considered structural canvas of Mondrian would suggest that his artistic type would be Apollonian. The calm beauty and clean lines of the Brabant landscapes inspired him. The Dutch Luminist compositions of light, dots and primary colours influenced Mondrian's oeuvre throughout his life. This practice was very much purposely considered and devised in Apollonian character towards an aesthetic received by minimal representation. 

Whistler's Mother - Arrangement in Black and Grey No:1 1871

[Whistler's] Mother is a noteworthy example of the treatment of primary and secondary elements. The arrangement and controlled use of toned down shades of black and grey, which are primarily used to present the referential quality of an ageing lady, highlights the subtle transition from the obscurity of the secondary status for dependency of content towards the primary status of form that is considered to constitute a higher beauty, the non-dependant judgement of the aesthetic. Fry's proposition in his formalist approach submitting that content is symbiotic with the associated and the dramatic idea, and where form can singularly illicit a response free from these ideas, is evident. The structural arrangement of volume, shape and tone conjure a presence of decline, stoicism and refrain with an added sense of weightiness regardless of the constituent dependency upon the figurative. However, more interestingly, these primary and secondary elements of form and content are transposed when considering beauty in the sublime, as discussed in Part Four.

Part Six - The Agreeable Aesthetic

Content & Form Transposed. A Priori Deduction. Impossible Disinterest. Beauty of the Sublime? An Agreeable Aesthetic

[Interestingly], the experience of beauty of the sublime is inferred by content not form, content having been established as the secondary element of representation when determining higher beauty. In contrast however, when we assess the beauty of an object, the primary element of form determines higher beauty. I would propose that beauty in the sublime can only represented and found in the boundless and infinite landscape of nature, not representative in form but in content, whilst a higher beauty in objects is only represented as form, as an aspect of formalism, especially in art.

[Content's] secondary status is transposed to primary status when determining beauty of the sublime as it is beyond our capabilities to identify any structure of form in such an extensive and immense visual landscape. Kant stated that the sublime must always be large and the beautiful must be small. There is a sense that Kant may be correct with his deduction. I would also suggest it is near impossible to apprehend the sublime in art. Reflecting upon an image of a thunderstorm, a representation of a representation (proposed by Aristotle)for example, we do not have a direct experience of this event nor do we feel we are in true conflict with Nature so therefore our sense of apprehension is amiss. Our senses are not exposed to all the nuances of the sublime experience and therefore, we can only conjure an artificial response. We simply deceive ourselves for the sake of art.

[However], I would contend there is an element of the sublime experienced by the large secondary colour-field canvasses of Mark Rothko. Some Rothko paintings are quite immense, up to eight feet in height and almost equally as wide. As directed by the artist, standing 18 inches away facing the canvass the large bands of colour pervade the senses almost imitating the experience felt of the vastness of natural phenomena. Most experience an emotional reception from such a non-figurative image. The paintings have a looseness of form imposed by the horizontal bands of colour and here, the theory of formalism can be applied especially when combined with the painterly texture. However, the essence of beauty is primarily derived from the combination of ambiguous content (an element that cannot be quantified), the expanse of the canvass and viewers distance which overall presents an overwhelming sublime encounter, the aboutness of something here can be something that is truly felt and not conceptualised.

Rothko Chapel Houston Texas

[Representation] of a representation - Aristotle believed art constituted a representation twice removed from original form. Firstly, we are presented with an object, it is form absolute. It will always exist and never alter over time. Secondly, we perceive a representation of this form, that is to say our cognitive facilities form an internal representation derived from our senses. We then apply a concept to what we see and hence develop an understanding. And thirdly, when we attempt to recreate this internal representation externally as a painting for example, the image is designated as a representation of a representation. I would be inclined to suggest that this third aspect is a 're-presentation' rather than representation.

[Aristotle] valued form thus created by a creator be it God or Nature. An artist's attempt to recreate this form was derivative, a false declaration of Nature. However, Rosenberg wrote of abstract expressionist art, in particular the American Action painters, 'My painting is not art; it's an Is.' 'It's not a picture of a thing; it's a thing itself'. 'It doesn't reproduce Nature; it is Nature'. Aristotle's The God creator has become the artist creator of absolute form, absolute higher beauty. Perhaps this is why abstract expressionism renders prolific emotional reception within individuals to such an extent that, as with the large canvasses of Rothko, tears of pure undiluted emotion are shed from the inability to articulate.

[The] theory of re-representation is evident especially in art where the act of putting paint to canvass is ultimately a subjective re-presentation or a representation regardless of narrative or subject. For example, Cezanne's Mont Sainte-Victoire c.1887 was painted at least sixty times by the artist, each sensitively capturing the essence of the vista but all signifying a slightly differing representation. Much like a selection of individuals recreating the same scene, this reinforces the fact that beauty is a re-presentation of the property of the subject and not of the object. Even though the true naturalistic scene exists objectively as the original form, its actual representation twice removed is never equivalent.

[There] is also another aspect to consider when expressing or suggesting an object is beautiful which may appear to be an objective assessment and that is the notion of 'a priori'. When an individual says a baby is beautiful in such a manner as to suggest that all babies are beautiful because of their inherent purity of innocence for example, they are mistaken, as an individual has no proof of this and more importantly, has no knowledge of this gained through experience. This is an 'a priori' judgement which can be defined as knowledge that is independent of current experience. Such a judgement is in no way evidence based.

[How] does this relate to the agreeable aesthetic? If the agreeable aesthetic is determined by a feeling that overrides any aspect of concept and/or understanding, once we attempt to express our overwhelming appreciation of such an experience and feel that all further experiences will be equally felt, then this is a priori, and we dispel any further free judgements as we have unwittingly earnt our way to based judgements.

[It] is evident it is largely impossible to judge the representation of an object in a disinterested fashion. If we negate any positive or negative biases when considering the aesthetic, we are consciously bringing to the fore our representational expectations of these in the opposite, in as much as we need to recognise one in order to negate the other, and vice versa. It is quite inescapable. Even if we are eventually able to view in the disinterest, we are forcing a particular perception of an object which could be considered a learnt activity. What has to made transparent is that judgements made with disinterest could constitute a dependant non-dependency.

[There] is evidence to suggest that when we consider the aesthetic, a judgement of taste, sensory information creates an indirect representation of our experiences. Actuality exists somewhat ambiguously as our senses together with cognitive reasoning do not conclusively present objects as they are, perhaps we are experiencing things as independent subjective structures more as they appear to be. Considering such examples in art, things as they exist are painted in a linear fashion whilst things as they appear to be are painted in a painterly fashion. The Greek sculptor Lysippus mastered this observation in the 4th Century BC by eloquently adapting Polykleitos' canon of proportional representation of the ideal human form by elongating bodily attributes and reducing the proportional size of the head thereby, inventing a new canon of sculptural proportion representing 'things as they appear to be'. This modification to the exiting canon was the first 'painterly abstraction' representation of an object as it appears, not as it exists. Such modification of ideal form represented a further step to content for meaning and expression.

[As] sculpture and art progressed from the ideal form towards ideal content, such significant ideals were articulated in language in a symbiotic progressive relationship. Such ideals became canonically based in language and therefore in structures of text. Beauty was therefore rendered in words (signifiers) which become representations of our perceptions and became as important as the works of art themselves. The value of beauty became valued in the hierarchy of words and the development of concepts. It still stands to reason that some experiences of beauty divest the embodiment of text and perhaps are more rewarding because of this.

[There] appears to be some ambiguity when using the word beauty, for what it can represent. It is such a common term of phrase and in this respect, the word 'beauty' may have lost its original significance. The word now, I would suggest, is generic and non-specific in as much as it is primarily used by those who are unable to express or articulate their true feelings about the aesthetics of an object. The word 'beauty' is now synonymous with broad based judgements of taste due to the necessity of the subject to understand conceptually so hierarchical value can be applied to the object. Undoubtedly, the term is also implemented with self-interest.

[Earlier] in the essay, it was suggested that words have become more valued, important and meaningful than the actual objects themselves, a canonic status of text and language. There are two facets of this suggested text value to acknowledge here but also how arbitrary this value can be. Each term or object identifier consists of the word as signifier and the object as the signified which refers to the concept or representation. The relationship between the signifier and the signified is completely arbitrary and is only ratified historically over time. The signifier for tree for example has no tree-like qualities, does not relate to any specific tree species and to a non-speaking English person means very little. What the signifier does is invoke a representation of the concept of a tree. This representation is purely abstract as the tree doesn't even have to exist to be acknowledged and therefore the signifiers value is completely abstract too.

[The] utilisation of particular signifiers differentiates representations from other representations for mental navigation and understanding. The sign or symbol (signifier plus the signified) has become the avenue for valuing an object and therefore, the concept. The Venus de Milo, Apoxyomenos and Doryphoros are mere abstract signs (texts). A further example attributed to the American Action painters canvasses has been attested by Harold Rosenberg, ' the representation of the action upon the canvas and it's outcome became its own representation and in essence, its own sign', a sign without signifier or signified, without catagorisation, concept or language.

[The] historical adoption and canonisation of such signs potentially place value on the physical objects themselves. The actuality of the sculptures become irrelevant and do not have to be experienced. The formalisation of their beauty is perhaps sustained in text. However, experiencing the actual artefact is altogether a personal participation and involvement of sensibility and feeling. Therefore, there are two conceptions of form and beauty to consider - the text and the visual experience.

[We] could conclude that our understanding of Kant's theory of higher beauty suggests there may be an unequivocal purity in the experience of feeling derived from form rather than through dependant content or an already defined and developed concept which can be experienced by all, universally. It is this 'universal subjectivity' of experience which is perhaps more significant than the orthodoxy of conceptualising which defines higher beauty. And when we experience this feeling devoid of any cognitive reliance, devoid of any self-interest, devoid of any dependency, we experience and witness something agreeable in the 'aboutness' of things within us. We experience an agreeable aesthetic.

Part Seven - Transition

Transition. The Invention of Beauty. Beauty Laid to Rest.

[If] the Venus de Willendorf represents the chthonic pagan Goddess of Paleolithic Dionysian nature, then the Nefertiti Bust represents the apollonian sky bound nature of absoluteness, control and the modernisation of thought. The transition from pagan Earth cult to heavenly Sky cult transformed early artistic rendering to a new formalised pictorial language of art. The weighted sleepiness, dull and chaotic nature of the Venus de Willendorf was superseded by an advancing progressive formalising and articulation of thought rendered in beauty and form. This is evident as the Willendorf is all body, Nefertiti is all head, all cerebral.

Venus de Willendorf c.28,000BC                                                                                                     Nefertiti Bust c.1345BC 

[Egyptian] creativity was empowered through ritual belief and devout artistic sensibility. Their language was all form, their architecture too was all form, the Great Pyramids for example. Form was the primary ambition and the primary artistic element, and through form beauty was discovered. The Egyptians gave the pre-Western closed eye structure, form, symmetry, harmonisation, style and the conceptualisation beauty. Liberation from Nature meant liberation of the object and of form.

Early Greek Kouros c.590BC

[Western] Eye once opened pervaded Ancient Greek culture. Sculptural form, almost tectonic in its composition, the early Kouros for example, was implemented as Apollonian mathematical precision imposed on chthonic mass. One foot stepped forward an indication of forthcoming progression from stoicism to pathos and sensibility. Sky cult birthed the symbiosis of beauty and form but also rescinded it. Monotheism (early Christianity) proclaimed the non-virtuous symbolism of the naked human form (therefore beauty) was indecent and immoral. Beauty became contaminated with false representation and was confined to darkness until it's resurrection at the end of The Middle Ages with the Renaissance which demystified ill representation of the human body. The naked human body is fundamental to the realisation of form and beauty as it was undoubtedly the benchmark set by the ancient Greeks as a result of a deep routed determination of wanting to discover and express their desire to articulate what they felt. Beauty was all around them and because of this, it is perhaps logical to conclude that only the Greek civilisation could have explored this aspect of their culture and progressive thinking.

[Many] philosophers have concluded that form presents a higher beauty which supersedes any derivative beauty drawn from what constitutes the content of form such as emotive responses to colour or how representational narratives connect with us. These types of constituents are by their nature open to interpretation and as such, any aesthetic judgements reflective of these constituents are considered a property of the subject and not a property of the object. As Locke suggested, primary qualities (form) are inherent in the object and secondary qualities (content) represent the disposition of the object. Similarly, Rosenberg concluded that colour, composition, drawing recognised as logical constitutes of form are simply auxiliaries to form and can therefore be dispensed with.

[Rosenberg], 'What is a painting that is not an object, or the representation of an object, mor the analysis or an impression of it?'. The answer is form.

[Kant] proposed higher beauty was stilled in form. Fry proposed form represented the higher aesthetic superseding narrative and content. Fry also suggested an aesthetic reception can be experienced from form regardless of content. Hegel proposed that beauty was signified by the product of our creativity which was granted through our spiritual acquiesce. Clive Bell wrote that content however charming and meaningful was in fact surplusage. Clement Greenberg proposed Clive Bell's theory of 'significant form' was the most important quality in art. Greenberg also suggested that art should be hermetic and totally independent of literary and anecdotal considerations. Neumann proposes that form is the highest state of artistic expression derived from the conflict and symbiosis of the Id and the Ego, Nietzsche's the Dionysian and the Apollonian actants. Rosenberg's the Artist Creator has superseded Aristotle's the God Creator of form absolute.

[Perhaps] it is simply the case that our 'disagreements' with each other about beauty are subjective and not the object. As Kant has previously illustrated, when we make a judgement of taste we are asking for the agreement of other people and it is within this discussion of the agreeable or the non-agreeable where subjectivity exists.